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Abstract 
The National Basketball Association claims to sell entertainment. Part of that 
entertainment is close, competitive contests with uncertain outcomes. However, 
hometown fans want the home team to win. Hence, the optimal probability that the home 
team wins a game, from the perspective of maximizing demand, lays somewhere between 
0.5 and 1.0. Using data from individual games for the 2001-02 season, this optimal 
probability was estimated to be approximately 0.66. Fans want their home team to have 
about twice the chance to win a game as the visiting team. 
 
Keywords: uncertainty of outcome, basketball, linear regression, home court advantage, 
demand, attendance 
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Introduction 
 Competitive balance is an important feature of sports leagues. If the outcome of a 
contest or a season is nearly certain, demand may begin to decline. Competitive balance 
can refer to the season-long race between teams for a league title or the closeness or 
uncertainty of each contest. As pointed out by Fort and Quirk (1992), competitive 
balance can also refer to the variation in champions from season to season. Further, 
competitive balance could refer to the closeness of a contest within the game itself, i.e., is 
the outcome of the game uncertain all the way up to the end of the game or has it been 
decided early on? If uncertainty of each game is important to customers, then the ex ante 
probability that the home team wins a particular game should be about 0.5 in order to 
maximize sales (e.g., attendance at sporting events or viewership on television). On the 
other hand, if fans want the home team to prevail in a particular contest, then the optimal 
ex ante probability that the home team will win should approach 1.0. If both of these 
components of demand are true, then the optimal probability will lay somewhere between 
0.5 and 1.0. 
 On average, teams lose as many games as they win, by definition, but more of 
those wins should come at home games and more of the losses occur on the road in order 
to maximize league revenues. It is consistent and optimal for leagues to attempt to 
maintain competitive balance throughout the season and concurrently have home teams 
win more often. 
 Can sport managers influence the desired home court advantage needed to 
produce a probability between 0.5 and 1.0? While outside of the scope of this article, 
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there appears to be some natural home field advantages that help the home team play well 
such as (1) familiarity with the field or court, (2) the home crowd energizing the home 
team, and (3) negligible travel weariness compared to what the visiting team faces. In 
some sports, the surface, size, and even shape of the court or field can be manipulated by 
the home team in order to improve the home field advantage.  
 For instance, in Major League Baseball (MLB), owners have been known to 
install artificial turf if their team is exceptionally fast or hits a lot of grounders and line 
drives because the turf (unlike grass) will not slow the ball down as much allowing it to 
travel further into the outfield. The St. Louis Cardinals of the 1980s were thought to have 
benefited from this because they were not a power hitting team, but did have a lot of fast 
runners in their line-up. Also, some home team groundskeepers would water down the 
area near first base when Rickey Henderson, the career leader in stolen bases in MLB, 
would arrive for a series of games against the home team, because it would hinder his 
ability to get a good jump and steal bases. This provides an advantage over homerun 
hitting teams. Similarly, the distance to the outfield fence can be brought in to produce 
many more homeruns or pushed further out to benefit a team with fast outfielders and 
batters who hit line drives, but not many homeruns. The Cleveland Indians purportedly 
pushed out their fence when they had the speedy center fielder Kenny Lofton. Fast teams 
in American football often like to play on artificial turf in order to accentuate their speed 
advantage. In the National Basketball Association (NBA), the court size and surface are 
essentially fixed by the league preventing the home team from varying the home 
field/court advantage above and beyond the natural home field advantages listed above. 
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 This research is an investigation of the ex ante optimal probability that a home 
team wins a game using data from the 2001-2002 NBA season. One result is an estimate 
of this optimal probability. The term “optimal” is based on the assumption that a team 
wants to maximize attendance at its home games, or that the maximization of attendance 
is a good proxy for the maximization of other objectives such as profits or revenues (or 
even wins). Késenne & Pauwels (2006) discuss how owner objectives tend to vary across 
leagues, continents, and even within leagues, and that real implications exist for talent 
demand, salaries, and competitive balance. 
 It has been shown that a team has a higher probability of winning a game when 
there are more of its fans in the stands (see Boyd & Boyd, 1998). Thus, maximizing 
attendance might be optimal for a win-maximizing franchise owner. Similarly, attendance 
has often been used in the literature as a proxy for revenue with the understanding that 
ticket prices are set prior to the season. Therefore, given a certain level for ticket prices, a 
franchise ought to want to maximize attendance. Finally, the bulk of the costs for an 
NBA team are fixed, not variable. Profit maximization is, thus, aligned with revenue 
maximization. Overall, whether or not an individual owner is a win maximizer, profit 
maximizer, or combination of the two, drawing the largest crowds possible is almost 
certainly going to be aligned with those broader objectives. Moreover, Bollinger & 
Hotchkiss (2003) reason that profit maximization (or near profit maximization) is likely 
to be the most common objective in Major League Baseball, for instance. 
 However, the cost of creating a team that can win at home more than on the road 
might outweigh the net financial gain from the associated higher attendance, thus causing 
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a divergence between attendance maximization and profit maximization. Disentangling 
that issue is beyond the scope of this research. 
 Other results of this study include the effect of Michael Jordan on demand, and an 
analysis of the diminishing effect of a previous season’s performance on demand as the 
season progresses. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of 
the literature on competitive balance and its effect on demand. The next section reviews 
the theory that predicts that the optimal probability should be between 0.5 and 1.0. 
Section IV describes the data and methodology used, while Section V shows the analysis 
and results. The final section concludes and discusses the importance of the findings. 
Previous Literature 
Neale (1964) first noted the “peculiar economics of professional sports” in that 
competitors desired other quality competitors. Today, this notion of greater competition 
having a positive effect on a firm’s bottom line is termed limited positive production 
network externality. Up to a point, more competitors are better than fewer, or higher 
quality competitors are better than lower quality competitors—a major exception to 
classical economic theory. In other words, higher revenues depend on increased on-the-
field competition between teams. In order to achieve competitive games, league 
management have instituted numerous rules—starting in 1876 with the reserve system in 
baseball—to the current set of policies that include rookie drafts, salary caps, luxury 
taxes, and revenue sharing. Fort (2002) and Leeds and von Allmen (2002) discuss league 
rules for increasing competitive balance. The efficacy of these rules in increasing or 
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maintaining competitive balance is currently under debate (see Fort & Quirk, 1992; 
Sanderson, 2002; and Rascher, 2002, for different perspectives on this debate). 
There have been dozens of studies performed on sport to determine how a variety 
of factors affect attendance or demand. In the early studies, Demmert (1973) and Noll 
(1974) found that absolute quality was in fact a significant determinant of attendance for 
baseball. More recently, Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert (1992) explain how uncertainty 
of outcome assumes that spectators increase their utility through sporting events that have 
a higher level of unpredictability, and that more evenly matched teams will yield less 
certain outcomes and thus, higher attendance. Some of the other demand factors analyzed 
include star players (Noll, 1974; Schurr, Wittig, Ruble, & Ellen, 1987; Schwartz, 1973; 
Scully, 1974), game schedules (Hill, Madura, & Zuber, 1982), and ticket prices (Bird, 
1982; Boyd & Boyd, 1998; Siegfried & Eisenberg, 1980). Butler (2002) includes a recent 
bibliography of studies of the determinants of demand for sporting events. Using a 
sample of 1988 Major League Baseball games, Knowles et al. (1992) found that the ex 
ante attendance maximizing probability that the home team would win a game is about 
0.60. Rascher (1999) used data for the entire 1996 MLB season and concluded that the ex 
ante optimal probability that the home team would win was between 0.60 and 0.67, 
depending on the specification. 
Theory 
 The theory being tested in this article is based on the sports league model 
developed by Rascher (1997). It contains both absolute and relative quality of play and 
competition as factors of demand. The model directly shows that the ex ante optimal 
probability that the home team wins a game is between 0.5 and 1.0. The empirical 
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analysis that follows will help determine where the optimal probability will fall within 
that range. 
The demand function takes the form 
Qh = Si(ATi + BTj + C(Ti - Tj)2 + other),     (1) 
with the restriction that A>B>0>C. Ti is the talent level of team i, while Tj is the talent 
level of team j. Qh is the demand for home games. A is the marginal propensity to attend 
home games with respect to the home team's quality. B is the marginal propensity to 
attend home games with respect to the visiting team's quality, and is assumed to be less 
important than home team quality to the hometown fans. C is the marginal propensity to 
attend home games that is attributable to the uncertainty of the contest outcome. The 
more divergent the talent levels of the two teams, the lower the demand. Si is a scalar that 
controls for the potential demand from market size, income, ticket prices, and other 
factors that vary across cities and over time. The restrictions on A, B, and C show that 
demand is maximized with respect to the home team’s talent (Ti ), by finding the 
maximum of the quadratic equation nested within the demand curve. The result is that Qh 
is maximized when Ti = Tj -(A/2C). Given that talent is not measured directly, winning 
percentage is a monotonic function of talent. Similarly, in order to determine the 
probability that the home team wins a particular game (Ph), the current winning 
percentage of the home team (wi; at home and on the road) and visiting team (wj) can be 
used to create a monotonic function of the home team’s winning percentage: 
)1()1(
)1(
ijji
ij
h
wwww
wwP −+−
−= .       (2) 
Hence, winning percentage is a proxy for talent and can be turned into a 
probability formula. The Appendix contains a derivation of the probability function. The 
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empirical analysis will use a quadratic of the probability function, not talent, which 
cannot effectively be measured. 
The hypotheses being tested are: (1) the absolute quality of the two teams is an 
important determinant of demand (A and B are both positive and significant), (2) home 
town fans are more sensitive to changes in the home team's talent level than to changes in 
the visiting team's talent level (A > B), and (3) fans want to see games where the outcome 
is uncertain (C < 0 and significant). Additionally, a direct estimate of the optimal (from 
the league's perspective) ex ante probability that the home team wins a particular game 
will be generated. 
Data and Methodology 
 The data includes information regarding each NBA game for the 2001-2002 
regular season. There are 25 variables for each of the 1189 observations (based on 29 
NBA teams playing 82 games each). 
Dependent Variables 
 Two different variables are used to define demand for each data set. One, a binary 
variable, “sell-out”, translates to a measure of the probability that there was an 
occurrence of a sell-out or near sell-out (greater than 95% of the capacity sold out). The 
second dependent variable is attendance.  
 Sell-outs, according to the definition used in this study, occurred 446 times over 
the entire regular season. Attendance ranged from 5,234 to 35,052 with a mean of 16,975 
and a standard deviation of 3,598. Table 1 provides a summary of the data. 
-- Insert Table 1 About Here -- 
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Time-Constant Independent Variables 
 Certain factors of demand are constant over time, but vary across teams. 
Population is a typical factor of demand for sporting events. The population of the 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), measured in millions, is used in this 
analysis and is expected to have a positive effect on attendance. Median household 
income and the unemployment rate are also included as potential determinants of 
demand. The expected effect of income is positive and unemployment negative, if NBA 
games are, in fact, normal goods. The percentage of the local population that is not white 
has historically been found to be negatively associated with NBA attendance. Noll 
(1974), Kahn and Sherer (1988), and Kanazawa and Funk (2001) each found a negative 
correlation between the racial characteristics of the local population and attendance at 
NBA games. 
 As with any demand function, ticket price is expected to have a negative effect on 
attendance. Most previous research, however, has not found a strong link between ticket 
price and demand (Fort & Quirk, 1992; Fort, 2005). However, Coates and Harrison, 
(2005) using instrumental variables estimation (IV) on a number of different ticket price 
definitions, find inelastic pricing that was statistically significant for MLB. The variation 
in ticket price in their analysis was across teams and over a number of years. In this study 
of NBA teams, the ticket price variable is constant for each game and only varies across 
teams; thus, IV estimation is not applicable. 
 Average ticket price is included in the analysis to capture the cost of attending an 
NBA game. In 2001-02 it ranged from $26.38 (Golden State Warriors) up to $65.95 
(New York Knicks), with an average of $41.91. The full cost of attending a basketball 
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game includes much more than just the ticket price. The Fan Cost IndexTM (FCI) includes 
the cost of concessions, parking, and some merchandise. It ranges from US$175.35 
(Toronto Raptors) to $357.90 (New York Knicks) with a league average of $244.44. 
 Lastly, home and visiting team previous season records are included. These 
records are measured using home and visiting season wins, which ranged from 15 to 58 
with a mean of 41 and a binary variable to denote if the home and/or visiting team made 
the playoff in the previous season. These two variables are expected to have a positive 
effect on attendance because season ticket decisions are often based on previous season’s 
quality, given that is the bulk of the information available on expected team performance. 
Time-Varying Independent Variables 
 The determinants of demand that vary from game to game are grouped into player 
quality, team quality, and the context of the game. The NBA promotes individual players 
relatively more than other sports leagues, which focus on marketing the teams 
themselves. The star player attributes consist of factors measuring the number of All-Star 
team members, the number of Top 10 scoring leaders, rebounding leaders, and assist 
leaders, and the number of top defensive players in each game. Each of these is expected 
to have a positive affect on attendance. 
 A separate indicator variable is used for games in which Michael Jordan appears. 
His impact is expected to be greater than that of simply an All-Star player. Hausman and 
Leonard (1997) estimated that Michael Jordan generated approximately $53 million in 
incremental attendance and merchandise revenues for all of the other teams in the NBA 
for the 1991-92 season. Their findings do not include revenue generated for his team or 
any other revenue streams for any teams, such as media revenues or concessions sales. 
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 Home opening game and weekend game (Saturday and Sunday) indicator 
variables are included as factors of demand. The home opener satisfies the pent-up 
demand from the off-season. Fans presumably have more time available to attend 
weekend games. Other research on baseball has shown the significant impact of opening 
day and weekend games. A weekend Major League Baseball game has a 25% higher 
attendance, ceteris paribus (Rascher, 1999). 
 The key variables of interest are those that account for absolute and relative team 
quality. The home team’s current winning percentage and the visiting team’s current 
winning percentage are utilized to create a number of variables: the difference between 
the home and visiting team’s winning percentages, the probability that the home team 
wins a game, and the probability squared.1 As described above, these will allow for the 
estimation of the optimal probability that the home team wins. 
Analysis and Results 
 There are three models examined in this analysis. The first model tests whether 
A>B>0>C, which would show that an important set of assumptions in the competitive 
balance model are true. Again, the assumptions are that the attendees care about the 
absolute quality of teams on the field (A > 0 and B > 0), they care about close contests or 
relative quality (0 > C), and they care more about the home team’s quality than the 
visiting team’s quality (A > B). The second model directly estimates the ex ante optimal 
probability that the home team wins the game. The third model also estimates the same 
probability, but uses an indicator variable of whether a game was nearly sold out instead 
of attendance as the measure of demand. Using the percentage of capacity sold out is one 
way to account for the truncation of the attendance variable. The number of truncated 
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games is significant. During the 2001-2002 season, approximately 37% of games 
recorded capacity sold out of greater than 95%. Another way to account for truncation of 
the dependent variable is to use a censored regression (similar to a tobit) that effectively 
estimates what attendance would be if there were not a capacity issue. 
 The first model is estimated using a censored regression that accounts for the 
occasional truncation of the dependent variable, attendance. Sensitivity analyses show 
that multicollinearity exists across the various measures of winning (winning percentage, 
last ten games winning percentage, previous season winning percentage, previous season 
playoffs). Thus, the final analysis removed the winning percentage over the last ten 
games variable and the previous season playoffs variable. As expected, serial correlation 
is not a problem, given that the data spans less than one year. The data are distributed 
approximately normal except for the dummy variables, which is typical. Further, the 
errors have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
 The second model uses the same estimation methods as the first model. However, 
multicollinearity is not an issue because there is only one measure of winning for the 
home and visiting teams—the probability that each team wins (see Appendix for a 
derivation). 
 The dependent variable in the third model is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
games in which attendance is at least 95% of capacity, and 0 otherwise. A probit analysis 
is used to estimate this model. This model is included for comprehensiveness, and 
specifically, as another way to account for the problem of sell-outs. However, as with all 
dummy variables, the dependent variable is a cruder measure of something else, 
attendance. 
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 A second set of analyses is prepared to provide more meaning for some of the 
independent variables. For instance, the home team winning percentage near the 
beginning of the season is very erratic because there are not many games in the 
denominator of the calculation. This is also true for all of the other winning-related 
variables. The second analyses use data after approximately 36% of the season has been 
played (from January 2002 to the end of the regular season). 
 The results for all three models using the full season of data are shown in Table 2. 
As the competitive balance theory predicts, the home team’s winning percentage effect 
was found to be positive, but greater than the visiting team’s winning percentage effect 
(A > B > 0), showing that fans respond relatively more to changes in their home team’s 
quality than that of the visiting team. Further, the squared difference in winning 
percentages has a negative impact on attendance, implying that fans care about close 
contests, all else equal (C < 0). 
-- Insert Table 2 About Here -- 
 The probability model generates an estimate of the optimal ex ante probability 
that the home team wins a game. The inclusion of the variable “Probability Home Team 
Wins” (PROB) and its squared term in the equation in Table 2 creates a quadratic 
relationship between Attendance and PROB. The attendance maximizing solution to this 
equation, 
 Attendance = f(aPROB + bPROB2),      (3) 
is PROB = -a/(2b). Demand is maximized when this probability is about 67% (i.e., -
a/(2b) = -11,340/(2*(-8,500)) = 67%), or when the home team has twice the chance as the 
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visiting team to win the basketball game. Likewise, the Sell-out Model, using the 
indicator variable as the dependent variable, finds a similar optimal probability of 66%. 
 There are a number of other interesting findings. The average change in 
attendance from an increase in home team quality shows that obtaining one more win 
during the middle of the season (21-21 record to 22-20; a 0.02381 increase in winning 
percentage) leads to an increase in attendance of about 177 fans per game. This is a gain 
of over 1% per game for each extra win. While NBA attendance varies much less than 
many other sports, the weekend effect was still relatively large at approximately 800 
additional attendees per game (an increase of nearly 5% per game). 
 Michael Jordan was one of the most demand-inducing team-sport athletes in 
North America during the time period. All 56 games in which he appeared in 2001-2002 
were sell-outs. His team, the Washington Wizards, sold out each of its 41 home games, 
including 10 games in which Jordan did not play. For a few teams, the home games 
against Jordan and his team were one of only a few that sold out.2 On the other hand, 
there were some teams that sold out many games with Jordan playing in either one or 
none of them (e.g., New York Knicks, Sacramento Kings, and Dallas Mavericks). 
 This analysis provides evidence in support of that argument. When comparing 
individual player effects, Michael Jordan draws more fans than the equivalent of 4 all-
stars or defensive team members. Based on the findings in Table 2 and Table 3, Michael 
Jordan drew about 3,000 more fans per game than would otherwise be the case. That is an 
increase of about 18%. That is likely to be a conservative estimate, given that each game 
he played in sold out. In other words, the true demand for his games was likely higher 
than the capacity at the basketball arena in which the game took place. 
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 There were multicollinearity problems with scoring leaders, rebounding leaders, 
and number of All-Stars playing in the game. The final model chosen excluded scoring 
leaders and rebounding leaders in favor of the number of All-Stars. 
-- Insert Table 3 About Here -- 
 The analysis based on the latter two-thirds of the season provides some expected 
results. The goodness-of-fit is higher, most likely because the winning-related variables 
are more stable and meaningful than for the entire season. As a season progresses, the 
impact of the results of the previous season on demand are expected to diminish. The 
effect of the home team’s previous season is smaller than it is for the entire season, 
dropping from 93 fans per game for each additional win during the prior season to 77. 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 Fans desire games in which the home team is expected to win, but not with 
certainty. In the early years of professional basketball, regional leagues would form and 
exist until one team dominated the circuit and the league faltered (Neft and Cohen, 1991). 
Fans did not want certainty in the games, but wanted true contests where the outcomes 
were uncertain. Today the concept of competitive balance is as important as it was a 
century ago. Leagues create rules in order to promote and maintain a desired level of 
competitive balance. However, individual teams try to create a home court advantage that 
allows them to win more often at home. A consequence of this is that, in equilibrium, 
they will lose more games on the road (because of similar measures by opposing teams), 
thereby not disturbing overall competitive balance (as measured by the dispersion of wins 
across teams throughout the season), but rather, distributing the wins to occur more often 
at home. 
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 This paper estimated the optimal ex ante probability that the home team would 
win a game for the National Basketball Association during the 2001-02 season. Team 
winning percentages were turned into probabilities of winning and, along with other 
control variables, were analyzed to determine their effect on demand. The ex ante optimal 
probability that the home team would win was calculated to be about 66% for the full 
season and about 60% for the last 757 games.3 Findings for baseball concluded that the 
optimal probability was about 70%. Economic theory would actually predict the opposite, 
but only slightly. The shorter the season, the more dominant a team has to be in order to 
ensure success (e.g., making the playoffs) because one bad game has more impact on 
success. If fans understand this, then they would want the home team to win with more 
certainty for a sport with a shorter season, such as basketball, than for a sport with a 
longer season, such as baseball. It becomes apparent that when basketball fans are 
assumed to be rational consumers, they are slightly more concerned with seeing 
competitive games than with seeing their team have certain success.  
 Another analysis was performed to test a theoretical demand model whose main 
features are (1) local fans want the home team to be of high quality, (2) fans want the 
visiting team to also be of high quality, although it is less important than that for the 
home team, and (3) fans want the outcome of the contest to be uncertain, not pre-
determined. The results supported the theoretical model. 
 A question was placed on the cover of Sports Illustrated on March 10th, 1997: 
“Are the Bulls so good they’re bad for the NBA?” In theory the answer is “Yes.” The 
Bulls had a record of 69-13 in the 1996-97 season on their way to another championship. 
However, the Bulls sold out all of their games that season anyway because of absolute 
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quality of play and a desire to see the spectacle of Michael Jordan and company play. If 
that dominance were to have continued for years, it could have led the NBA to become 
dull and pre-determined. The positive effect on demand of a star player dominating a 
sport compared with the negative effect of the loss of uncertainty of outcome is not fully 
understood. It appears that the star effect is larger than the uncertainty of outcome effect, 
but that might not be the case if the particular star effect were to continue unabated for a 
long period of time, and thus, cause games and seasons to become predictable. 
 There is some current evidence of this in certain soccer leagues in Europe where a 
few teams with star players dominate each season (see Lago, Simmons, & Szymanski, 
2006), causing the fans of the second tier clubs to lost interest, and historically in MLB 
when the New York Yankees dominated baseball in the 1920s and saw declines in 
attendance at home games and for other teams in the league. Similarly, the original 
American Basketball League (in the 1920s) suffered because of competitive imbalance 
issues. Recent research by Paul and Weinbach (2007) shows that the expected uncertainty 
of outcome is an important determinant in the number of fans watching National Football 
League games on television. 
 As discussed above, these findings help focus a league on the amount of home 
court advantage that it should want each team to have. How can teams improve home 
court advantage? There is a belief that one aspect of home court advantage is the crowd 
providing emotional energy to the home team players and well-placed noise to disrupt the 
opponent. Research shows that sporting events with higher attendances improve the 
chances of the home team winning the game (Boyd & Boyd, 1998; Liu, Li, Wang, & Liu, 
2002). One source of home court advantage is familiarity with the playing surface and 
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lighting (St. John, 2003). Another source of home court advantage is the noise created by 
the home team’s sound system (Bailey, 2001). A commonly discussed source that a home 
team does not have control over is the wear on the body from travel. Also, referees are 
often accused of making calls to benefit the home team. Some believe that various 
leagues support this in order to satisfy the home team crowds, but no recent concrete 
evidence of this has been found for major North American sports leagues. 
 An important area of future research is to determine how to change home court 
advantage and the effects of each method so leagues can determine how much leniency to 
give. In baseball, the home team can change the size of the field to fit its talent, but not in 
basketball. Also, what are the findings for sports outside of North America, and if they 
are significantly different, then why? 
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Endnotes 
1 To be clear, the home team’s current winning percentage is the winning percentage of 
the home team for a specific game prior to the start of the game. It is not a reflection of 
the percentage of home games a team has won up to that point. 
 
2 One of the two sellouts for the Charlotte Hornets, one of the four sellouts for the 
Chicago Bulls (Jordan’s former team), one of the three sellouts for the Cleveland 
Cavaliers, one of the three sellouts for the Houston Rockets, and two of the three sellouts 
for the Miami Heat were games against Jordan and his teammates. 
 
3 It should be noted that this is an average across each NBA team and it is likely that the 
optimal probability varies across teams. 
 
    
  Do Fans Want Close Contests? 25 
Appendix 
This shows the derivation of the probability that the home team will win a particular 
game based on winning percentages (Fort and Quirk, 1995). 
 
If Ti and Tj are the playing strengths of team i and j, then the probability that team i beats 
team j is 
 ji
i
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The expected winning percentage of team i when playing an average team is 
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where T  is the average strength of each team in the league, and n is the number of teams 
in the league. Solving equations (4) and (5) for Ti and Tj leads to 
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Plugging back into equation (4) and letting n go to infinity yields the probability equation 
based on winning percentages 
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Dependent Variable: Minimum Mean Maximum
Attendance 5,234         16,975       35,052       
Whether a Game was Sold Out 0 0.38 1
Time-Constant Variables:
Number of Home Team Previous Season Wins 15 41 58
Home Team Previous Season Playoff Team 0 0.59 1
Fan Cost Index (FCI) 175.35 244.35 357.9
Ticket Price (as reported in FCI) $26.38 $41.91 $65.95
Median Household Income in CMSA $26,543 $45,655 $61,466
Percentage Non-white in CMSA 0.035 0.33 0.717
Population of CMSA (In Millions) 0.36 3.52 16.3
Unemployment Rate of CMSA 0.005 0.06 0.098
Stadium Seating 16,285 19,670 22,879
Game-by-Game Variables:
Estimated Probability the Home Team Will Win 0 0.50 1
Home Win/Loss Percentage 0 0.49 1
Visitor Win/Loss Percentage 0 0.49 1
Average Difference in Win Percentages 0 0.18 1
Home Win Percentage in Last Ten Games 0 0.49 1
Visitor Win Percentage in Last Ten Games 0 0.50 1
Number of All-Stars Playing 0 1.62 4
Michael Jordan Playing in Game 0 0.05 1
Scoring Leaders Playing 0 0.63 2
Rebounding Leaders Playing 0 0.62 2
Assist Leaders Playing 0 0.60 2
Number of Defensive Team Members Playing 0 0.67 4
Game is on a Weekend 0 0.30 1
Home Opener 0 0.02 1
Visiting Team Previous Season Number of Wins 15 41 58
Visiting Team Previous Season Playoff Team 0 0.59 1
TABLE 1: 2001-2002 National Basketball Association
Game-by-Game Summary Statistics
Notes: (1) There are 1189 observations.
(2) The data is for the regular season only.
(3) The data is from www.sfo.com/~csuppes/NBA/index.htm, www.nba.com, U.S. Census, 
Statistics Canada, and Team Marketing Report.
(4) The All-Star category is based on whether the player was in the All-Star game during the 
2001-2002 season.  The scoring, rebounding, and assist leader variables are based on the 
final tally at the end of the season, but clearly indicates the leaders at the time.  The 
defensive players were those who made the 1st Team NBA All-Defensive Team during the 
2001-2002 season.  
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Model: A > B > 0 > C Probability Model Sell-out Model
Adjusted R-Squared or Pseudo R-squared 0.41 0.31 0.14
F-Value or Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared 35.92 34.34 226.61
Number of Observations 1189 1189 1189
Optimal Probability Home Team Wins --- 0.67 0.66
Independent Variables:
Constant -3353.01***
(-6.53) --- ---
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage 7424.61***
(3.69) --- ---
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared -4875.14***
(-2.55) --- ---
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage 3507.10
(1.07) --- ---
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared -2062.50
(-0.99) --- ---
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages 381.93
(0.57) --- ---
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages Squared -344.19
(-0.49) --- ---
Probability Home Team Wins
---
11340.87***
(2.73)
3.39*
(1.65)
Probability Home Team Wins Squared
---
-8500.70**
(-2.05)
-2.55
(-1.25)
Home Team Previous Season Wins 93.29***
(6.21) --- ---
Visiting Team Previous Season Wins 5.68
(0.48) --- ---
Michael Jordan 4235.76***
(9.89)
2290.80***
(5.82)
2.32***
(6.76)
Allstar Team Members (2001-02 Season) 72.12
(0.71)
518.72***
(5.12)
0.15***
(3.31)
Assist Leaders (Top 10, 2001-02 Season) -792.23***
(-6.06)
-723.39***
(-5.11)
-0.070
(-1.08)
Defensive Team Members (2001-02 Season) 323.13***
(2.61)
552.44***
(4.66)
0.18***
(3.42)
Weekend Game 872.15***
(4.93)
767.78***
(3.99)
0.35***
(4.08)
Fan Cost IndexTM (FCI) -1.87
(-0.87)
5.72***
(3.99)
0.00086
(0.88)
Median Household Income in Local CMSA 0.033**
(2.30)
-0.048***
(-3.62)
-0.000018***
(-2.75)
Non-White Percentage in Local CMSA -10.17
(-1.34)
-16.35**
(-1.98)
-0.053
(-0.15)
Population of Local CMSA (in Millions) 118.60***
(4.83)
65.53***
(2.51)
-0.0091
(-0.79)
Unemployment Rate in Local CMSA (%) 44491.05***
(6.72)
26728.90***
(3.91)
-0.48
(-0.14)
T-statistics are in parentheses.  Significance: * - 10% level; ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level.
TABLE 2: Regression Results: Full Season
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Model: A > B > 0 > C Probability Model Sell-out Model
Adjusted R-Squared or Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.37 0.14
F-Value or Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared 24.81 30.5 148.05
Number of Observations 757 757 757
Optimal Probability Home Team Wins --- 0.60 0.61
Independent Variables:
Constant -12490.86***
(-3.76) --- ---
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage 4751.80
(0.85) --- ---
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared 2989.54
(0.54) --- ---
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage 2792.41
(0.56) --- ---
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared 2946.57
(0.57) --- ---
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages -259.72
(-0.15) --- ---
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages Squared -1332.40
(-0.78) --- ---
Probability Home Team Wins
---
35418.28***
(2.53)
11.92*
(1.79)
Probability Home Team Wins Squared
---
-29652.20**
(-2.14)
-9.77
(-1.48)
Home Team Previous Season Wins 77.45***
(3.65) --- ---
Visiting Team Previous Season Wins 14.96
(0.96) --- ---
Michael Jordan 3700.02***
(5.84)
3086.40***
(4.87)
2.038***
(4.46)
Allstar Team Members (2001-02 Season) -325.14**
(-2.27) --- ---
Assist Leaders (Top 10, 2001-02 Season) -705.69***
(-4.26)
-537.003***
(-3.18)
-0.0028***
(-4.46)
Defensive Team Members (2001-02 Season) 23.55
(0.14)
308.24
(2.02)
0.094
(1.35)
Weekend Game 1141.53***
(5.23)
1131.72***
(4.91)
0.45***
(4.14)
Fan Cost IndexTM (FCI) -1.81
(-0.67)
1.50
(0.55)
-0.00050
(-0.40)
Median Household Income in Local CMSA 0.027
(1.35)
-0.043***
(-2.63)
-0.000012
(-1.51)
Non-White Percentage in Local CMSA -1042.57
(-0.97)
-5127.20***
(-5.49)
0.19
(0.41)
Population of Local CMSA (in Millions) 120.70***
(3.75)
102.46***
(3.08)
0.0063
(0.43)
Unemployment Rate in Local CMSA (%) 38437.53***
(4.84)
37890.74***
(4.74)
-1.14
(-0.28)
T-statistics are in parentheses.  Significance: * - 10% level; ** - 5% level; *** - 1% level.
TABLE 3: Regression Results: January Through the End of the Season
 
 
 
